In The Rules of The Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, Andrew Gordon has written the best book on Jutland I’ve read to date. In fact, Gordon has actually written three books and skillfully intertwined them together.
For those of you who are unfamiliar with the battle, it essentially unfolded in three parts. First was when the Royal Navy’s “Battle Cruiser Force” (BCF), led by Admiral Sir David Beatty, found Admiral Hipper’s Fast Scouting Force. Hipper turned away from Beatty and began “The Run to the South” attempting to draw Beatty into range of the rest of the German High Seas fleet, which would destroy Beatty’s battle cruisers, and reduce the British margin of superiority in numbers of dreadnoughts. The first part of Gordon’s book covers this part of the action, with particular emphasis on Beatty’s difficulty exercising effective command of the 5th Battle Squadron (5BS) of battleships which was attached to the BCF in lieu of some battlecruisers who were temporarily assigned elsewhere.
The second, and really delightful, part of the book is a very detailed analysis of WHY Beatty had such difficulty managing 5BS. This analysis, focused on the 1893 collision between HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown, but actually dealing with events from the 1860s until the outbreak of WWI, could have stood on its own as a very effective history of command and control policies and doctrines of the Royal Navy as it transitioned from Sail to Steam as well as an examination of the effects of extended periods of peace on organizations designed for war. It is well written, thorough and convincing.
Having satisfactorily explained (at least for this reader) Beatty’s difficulties, the book then rejoins the action after Beatty discovers the trap laid for him by Hipper and turns his BCF 180 degrees beginning the second part of the battle, the “Run to the North”. By turning North, back toward the British main body, Beatty was trying to lead the entire German fleet into action with Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet, which enjoyed a substantial numerical superiority over the Germans. Beatty was attempting to do to Scheer and Hipper what they had very nearly done to him. It very nearly worked. Beatty did lead the German’s into gun range of the Grand Fleet, but Scheer, quickly understanding the precariousness of his position, disengaged by rapidly turning away from the British and disappearing into the late afternoon mist. The two fleets were in only desultory and intermittent contact during the night, and by daybreak, Scheer had run to safety.
The third part of the book is a careful study of the early historiography of the battle as adherents of Both Beatty and Jellicoe each tried to blame the other for the inconclusive nature of the battle, which failed to destroy the German fleet. As with both the battle narrative and the command and control analysis, this survey of post-war efforts to shape public perception is very nearly a complete work in itself.
Finally, the book winds up with a set of 28 axioms or proposals on military command and control functions that make use of the findings of the book as well as Royal Navy experiences in both the Falkland Islands War (1982) and the First Gulf War (1990-91).
All three parts of the book are excellent. Both the battle narrative and command and control survey are extremely engaging and well written. In the battle narrative, Gordon does a simply outstanding job of integrating first person accounts of survivors with comprehensive surveys of the accumulating damage on the ships. It is just excellent. However, readers should be aware that the book really is almost exclusively focused on the British view of the battle, with very little coverage given to the German perspective. IIRC, there was only one German personal account, that of the gunnery officer on one of the German battlecruisers, used in the narrative.
The C&C survey is also very well written and does an excellent job of explaining to readers who the protagonists were, as well as the “hows and whys” of their interactions. Gordon’s writing also does an excellent job of recreating the Edwardian era and the Royal Navy of that era to illustrate important points how and why things turned out as they did.
Finally, the section on the postwar recriminations is also very well done. Gordon seems fair and objective in judging the merits of the two sides, and somewhat surprisingly, sides mainly with Beatty’s proponents, while acknowledging that Beatty was really a pretty unsavory character and had made a good many mistakes of his own.
I highly recommend this book. Although not as a general history of the battle. It’s almost total failure to consider the German point of view precludes it from being that. However, it really is an excellent addition to the literature on Jutland. It really is probably the best thing out there on Jutland, at least from the British perspective, as well as tremendously interesting.
65 for the year.